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1. Introduction 
 
Georg Henrik von Wright’s book Explanation and Understanding (1971) is a modern classic 
in analytic hermeneutics, and in the philosophy of the social sciences and humanities in 
general. In this work, von Wright argues against naturalism, or methodological monism—
that is, the idea that both the natural sciences and the social sciences follow broadly the same 
general scientific method and aim to achieve causal explanations. Against this view, von 
Wright argues that the social sciences are qualitatively different from the natural sciences: 
according to his view, the natural sciences aim at causal explanations, whereas the purpose 
of the social sciences is to understand their subjects. In support of this conviction, von Wright 
also offers a version of the so-called logical connection argument.  
Von Wright distinguishes two traditions in the history of science and philosophy, 
which he calls the Aristotelian and the Galilean traditions; these involve two different views 
of explanation: causal-mechanistic explanation and finalistic explanation. Von Wright views 
causal explanation along the lines of the traditional covering law model of explanation. 
Finalist explanations, by contrast, lean on intentions, goals, or purposes. Causal explanation, 
according to von Wright, is characteristic of the natural sciences, while the latter is 
distinctive of the social sciences. 
Von Wright argues that human action cannot be explained causally in accordance with 
the covering law model, but must be understood as intentional. As a model of intentional 
understanding, he presents instead “practical syllogism”, which puts actions into a kind of 
“logical connection” with beliefs and desires.  
Von Wright also aims to demonstrate that intentional understanding, characteristic of 
the social sciences, is essentially different from that of causal explanation: in a causal 
relationship, cause and effect are conceptually independent of each other, while in a practical 
syllogism the action is—so the argument seeks to demonstrate—in a strong conceptual 
(“logical”) dependency between intentions and beliefs and desires. 
 
 
2. The key ideas of Explanation and Understanding 
 
Following a powerful tradition, von Wright assumes the traditional view that causal 
explanation in the natural sciences is aptly characterized by the covering law model, also 
known as “the subsumption theory of explanation” (or, with reference to its most famous 
advocate, “Hempel’s model”. Hempel in fact formulated two variants: “the 
deductive-nomological model” and “the inductive-statistical model”; see Hempel 1965). 
According to it, a phenomenon or an event is explained by subsuming it under general laws. 
Schematically, such explanations have the following form: 
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L1, L2 . . . Ln  general laws 
C1, C2 . . . Cn  initial, specific conditions 
-------------------------- 
     E   the explanandum—an event to be explained 
 
Causal explanation, so understood, is thus a form of inference: the event to be 
explained is inferred from the initial conditions and one or more general laws; in their light, 
the explanandum ceases to be surprising. According to Hempel, scientific explanations are 
always nomological—in other words, they always involve at least one law. Hempel 
famously argued that this model also covers explanation in history (Hempel 1942); this was 
von Wright’s point of departure.  
In the background of this model of explanation lurks the regularity theory of causation, 
popular among empiricist philosophers ever since Hume. According to the regularity theory, 
roughly, c causes e if and only if all events of type C (i.e., events that are like c) are regularly 
followed by events of type E (i.e., events like e).  
In addition, von Wright presented in his work an original picture on causation: a 
version of the manipulability theory of causation (similar ideas had been advocated already 
by Collingwood (1940) and Gasking (1955)). That is, von Wright suggested that we should 
analyze causation in terms of the concept of manipulability:1  
 
p is a cause relative to q, and q an effect relative to p, if and only if by doing p we 
could bring about q or by suppressing p we could remove q or prevent it from 
happening (von Wright 1971, p. 70).  
  
On the one hand, von Wright thus ties scientific explanation—at least in the natural 
sciences—closely to the covering law model, and thus implicitly to the regularity view of 
causation. On the other hand, von Wright also defends a specific manipulability theory of 
causation. This raises the question of whether von Wright clearly saw the difference between 
these two views of causation (more of this below). In any case, the presence of these two 
theories in von Wright’s thought creates some kind of tension. 
Be that as it may, von Wright presents, as an alternative to the covering law model in 
the social sciences, what he calls “practical syllogism”, a scheme for understanding human 
actions. It is an inference which has the following form:2 
 
X intends to bring about P. 
X considers that he cannot bring about P unless he does A.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Therefore, X sets herself to do A. 
  
                                                          
1 The use of “could” in this analysis shows that von Wright thought of causation in broadly counterfactual 
terms. 
2 This is only a very rough formulation. Von Wright put forward a number on refinements in his (1971) and in 
later publications (cf. Kusch 2003). Such further details are, though, quite irrelevant for our present discussion. 
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According to von Wright, practical syllogism provides “the sciences of man” with “an 
explanation model in its own right which is a definite alternative to the 
subsumption-theoretic covering law model” (von Wright 1971, p. 27). He continues: 
 
Broadly speaking, what the subsumption-theoretic model is to causal explanation and 
explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to teleological 
explanation and explanation in history and the social sciences (ibid).  
 
Von Wright denied that an intention (for example, X’s intention to bring about P) could 
ever be the cause of the behavior at stake; in other words, the relationship between them is 
not, in his view, causal. He points out, first, that philosophers, particularly after Hume, have 
distinguished between cause and effect, on the one hand, and (logical or conceptual) ground 
and consequence, on the other hand; cause and effect are logically independent of each other. 
Accordingly, von Wright calls a causal relationship which satisfies this requirement of 
logical independence between its relata “Humean” (this is a much more general idea than 
the regularity theory of causation, often associated with Hume) (von Wright 1971, p. 93). 
More exactly, then, he considers the question of whether intention or will could be a Humean 
cause of an action (ibid). 
Von Wright contends that if the relation between intention and behavior is causal, there 
must be a general law (non-logical nomic connection) involved (von Wright 1971, p. 97)—
and practical syllogism would be only a disguised form of nomological-deductive 
explanation in accordance with the covering law model (von Wright 1971, p. 98). However, 
he notes that the premises of practical syllogism contain explicitly no laws. Furthermore, he 
argues that no laws are presupposed in the background of the inference—for example, laws 
that would connect specific types of intentions to the behavior or action of a particular type.  
Von Wright further argued that the conclusion of practical syllogism cannot be verified 
in any other way except verifying the premises, and vice versa—and that their relationship 
is therefore conceptual and not (Humean) causal (von Wright 1971, pp. 94-, 107-). This is 
his special version of the logical connection argument.3  
 
 
3. Recent developments in the philosophy of science 
 
Since the publication of von Wright’s classic work over four decades ago, the terrain of the 
philosophy of science has changed in many ways. As we have seen, von Wright bound causal 
explanation in science tightly to the covering law model. This was indeed the received view 
at the time. In the philosophy of science today, by contrast, it is practically universally agreed 
that the regularity theory of causation is implausible, and that the covering law model is also 
utterly untenable as an account of explanation in the natural sciences, and of causal 
explanation in general. 
First, the regularity theory is not able to distinguish true causal dependencies and mere 
accidental correlations. For example, a sudden drop in the reading of a barometer is regularly 
                                                          
3 Other versions of the logical connection argument were presented by Anscombe (1957), Winch (1958), 
Melden (1961), and Taylor (1964), for example. 
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succeeded by the occurrence of a storm. However, it does not follow—pace the regularity 
theory—that the barometric reading caused the storm; rather, a drop in atmospheric pressure 
caused both the barometric reading and the storm.4  
Second, even in many natural sciences other than physics (in the biological and 
medical sciences, for example), there are hardly any genuine laws, but they still give 
explanations all the time—explanations which are apparently causal. Von Wright, however, 
assumes that if the connection between the two events or states of affairs (e.g., between 
intention and action) is causal, it must necessarily involve a general law. 
Traditionally, the covering law model of explanation has been motivated by the 
positivist-empiricist conception of causation: at the level of observation, we can only know 
that certain types of observable events occur regularly after certain observable events of a 
second type. Postulating some deeper “necessary” causal connection between the events is 
considered to be illegitimate metaphysics. This is the regularity view of causation. 
As noted above, however, von Wright presents also his own, quite different view of 
causation. The manipulability theory of causation, as formulated by him and some others 
(Collingwood, Gasking), did not as such gain much popularity at the time. First, this theory 
of causation was commonly seen as too anthropocentric, that is, too dependent on the human 
agent: It seems to entail that causation could occur only where a human agent can manipulate 
the initial conditions. However, there are causal relations, for example, between some distant 
celestial bodies or between some past events of history, even if they are virtually beyond the 
reach of human impact. Second, the manipulability theory has also been considered to be 
circular, as it seems to presuppose causal notions.5 
More recently, the so-called “interventionist” theory of causation has become 
increasingly popular in the philosophy of science. It has been developed especially by 
Woodward (1997, 2000, 2003), although related ideas have been put forward, for example, 
by Pearl (2000) and Spirtes et al. (2000). An account of scientific explanation based on it is 
also a promising candidate for replacing the covering law model as the standard model of 
causal explanation. 
What is interesting in our present context is that this theory is a direct heir and a variant 
of the earlier manipulability theory of von Wright and others. The core concept of this theory 
is “intervention”. Heuristically, one may think of interventions as manipulations that might 
be carried out by a human agent in an idealized experiment. Nevertheless, the approach is 
not in any problematic sense anthropocentric, as completely natural hypothetical 
interventions (i.e., interventions that do not involve human agents) are possible, and 
                                                          
4 This is a problem for the simple regularity theory of causation. Both the later advocates of the covering law 
model such as Hempel (see e.g. Hempel 1965, 338-9) and von Wright seem to have been aware of such 
problems to some extent (see, e.g., von Wright 1971, p. 15). Refining the notion of law in terms of 
counterfactuals was considered (von Wright 1971, pp. 21-22). There was not, though, yet a satisfactory analysis 
of counterfactuals in turn available. Moreover, it is not obvious how well a counterfactual account of laws 
coheres with the regularity theory of causation and the general empiricist view behind it. Finally, neither 
Hempel nor von Wright never seriously questioned the requirement that causal explanation must be necessarily 
based on laws (cf. the second objection that follows).   
5 See Woodward 2013. How fair such accusations are in von Wright’s case is open to debate. He seems to have 
been aware of such problems, and at least attempted to circumvent them. This is even more clear in Causality 
and Determinism, where he points out that “causation is ontically independent of agency" (von Wright 1974, 
pp.  49-50). 
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intervention can be defined in purely causal terms, without any reference to human activity. 
That a causal vocabulary is openly presupposed means that the interventionist theory does 
not even aim to give a reductive analysis of causation. Still, this does not make the approach 
viciously circular: “c causes e” is explicated with the help of other causal relations and 
correlational information. 
The interventionist theory is a well-developed version of the more general 
counterfactual approach to causation (cf. Menzies 2014). Counterfactual accounts are based 
on different “what-if-things-had-been-different” considerations. Causal relations are 
analyzed by examining certain contrary-to-facts (“counterfactual”) alternative possible 
scenarios. David Lewis (1973) in particular has been an influential figure here.  
Assume thus that c has occurred first, and then e has occurred. When exactly is it 
warranted to conclude that c caused e? Under what circumstances it is correct to say that 
the relation between these events is really causal and not merely accidental correlation? The 
basic idea of the counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can 
be explained in terms of conditionals of the form: 
 
If c had not occurred, e would not have occurred. 
 
Such conditional statements, in which the antecedent is contrary to the facts (assuming 
that the alleged cause c actually occurred), are referred to as “counterfactual conditionals”, 
or simply as “counterfactuals”. Roughly, then, the relation at stake is causal (i.e., c is a cause 
of e) if and only if the above counterfactual conditional holds.6 
As was already noted, the interventionist theory is a version of the counterfactual 
theories of causation. According to it, whether a relation is causal can be evaluated with the 
help of counterfactuals which have to do with the outcomes of hypothetical interventions. 
Such counterfactuals are called ‘‘active counterfactuals.’’ These are such that their 
antecedents are made true by an intervention, and have the form:7 
 
If c’s occurrence had been changed by an intervention into c’s absence, then e’s 
occurrence would have changed into e’s absence. 
 
Note in particular that no laws (covering c and e) are required in the counterfactual and 
interventionist approaches for causation. 
One way of motivating the interventionist approach is to ask the following questions: 
What is the point of our having a notion of causation (in contrast to, say, a mere notion of 
correlation) at all? What role or function does this concept play in our lives? Why do we 
care to distinguish between causal and merely correlational relationships? (cf. Woodward 
2003, p. 28) According the interventionist approach, the answer is that such knowledge of 
genuine causal relationships is, sometimes, practical and applicable: by manipulating the 
                                                          
6 Put this simply, the view faces immediate problems (the “pre-emption” cases). Lewis (1973) was already 
aware of them, and presented a more sophisticated theory; cf. Menzies 2014.  
7 This is an extremely rough formulation and omits many niceties of the theory. In reality, the interventionist 
theory of causation has been developed into a sophisticated theory. In any case, the interventionist setting helps 
to avoid many of the problems that the standard counterfactual theory faces; see, for example, Menzies 2014, 
§4.3. 
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cause we can influence the effect. If there is a real causal relationship between A and B, 
manipulating A is a way to change B; mere correlation between C and D, on the other hand, 
just disappears if one attempts to affect D by manipulating C. (Obviously, our knowledge of 
causal relationships and our interest in them need not be restricted only to applicable causal 
relations; it can certainly be purely theoretical and based on curiosity. Not all science is 
applied science.) Thus, we can try to find a cure for AIDS, suppress poverty, or prevent 
eutrophication of the Baltic Sea on the basis of knowledge about the causal relationships 
associated with them. 
Real causal relationships can, in favorable circumstances, be distinguished from 
accidental correlations experimentally by manipulating the initial conditions (the putative 
causes) and investigating whether this has consequences on the effects (surely, this is often 
in practice impossible). The interventionist theory of causation thus emphasizes the close 
connection between causal thinking and experimental research (and manipulation and 
control).8 
 
 
4. Causal explanations and the social sciences again 
 
In recent years, several philosophers have argued that from the point of view of the 
counterfactual theories of causation and causal explanation, it is unproblematic to think that, 
for example, in history and the social sciences, one could present and will present causal 
explanations (see, for example, Lebow 2007, 2010; Nolan 2013; Raatikainen 2011; Reiss 
2009).  
From this perspective, human actions, singular historical events, and such may also 
well be explained causally, for example, by citing the mental states—such as desires and 
beliefs, intentions and reasons—of the relevant human agents as causes. For example, the 
event that a King declared war may be explained causally, for its part, by the King’s (perhaps 
false) belief that the neighboring country was planning an invasion. The belief can well be 
viewed as a cause of the declaration of war and subsequent battles: if the King had not had 
that belief, he would not have declared war.  
Accordingly, Lebow (2010) examines historical explanations of the outbreak of the 
First World War from the perspective of the counterfactual theory of causation.9 Reiss (2009) 
discusses a few interesting historical episodes in some detail from the counterfactualist 
perspective. I have myself presented (Raatikainen 2011) a fairly detailed case study on 
historical research concerning the so-called Club War, the 1596 peasant uprising in an area 
of what is now Finland, which has attracted much interest among Finnish historians. I argue 
that the interpretations of the historians can be naturally analyzed in accordance with the 
counterfactual and in particular the interventionist theory of causation, and it is natural to 
take them as presenting causal explanations.  
Although the specific beliefs, desires, intentions, and motives that guided the main 
historical agents are internal mental states, even they can very well be the causes of actions 
                                                          
8 The interventionist theory of causation is also beginning to play an important role in the philosophy of mind 
and the issue of mental causation; see, for example, Raatikainen 2010; Woodward 2008. 
9 As is happens, von Wright reflected on the very same example; he obviously attempted to show that the 
explanation is not causal. From the counterfactualist perspective, though, it is difficult to see why it could not 
be.  
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and events, and causally relevant factors from this point of view: if a counterfactual 
intervention would have changed the relevant beliefs (or desires) of these agents, for 
example, the course of events would have been different. 
This suggests that even if the social sciences perhaps study a specific human aspect of 
reality which cannot be reduced to the reality studied by the natural sciences, the social 
sciences can nevertheless be viewed as providing causal explanations in fundamentally the 
same way as the natural sciences do. Therefore, a proper understanding of these issues in the 
philosophy of science removes a key reason to oppose methodological monism, or 
naturalism.  
In sum, if causation is understood—in accordance with the widespread consensus in 
philosophy nowadays—as counterfactual dependence and not as necessarily based on laws, 
there is no real obstacle to taking the various explanations in the social sciences as normal 
causal explanations. The internal states of mind or motives of the human agents may also be 
causes. 
 
 
5. What about the logical connection argument? 
 
It is certainly natural to think of a person’s beliefs and desires as being causally relevant to 
the person’s behavior. But as we have noted, the so-called logical connection argument 
advocated by von Wright and many others denies the very meaningfulness of such a 
“causalist” view: It is argued that there is a tight analytical (“logical”) connection between a 
person’s action and her reasons for it. Hence, so the argument goes, the relation between the 
latter cannot be causal.  
Davidson (1963), by contrast, put forward a response rather early on that has become 
quite influential. His argument begins with the observation that an event can be described 
(in a language) in many different ways; there may be conceptual dependence between 
particular descriptions of two events, for example, of a mental event and the subsequent 
action. The causal connection, though, holds between a pair of events in the world, and not 
between particular linguistic ways of describing them: “the truth of a causal statement 
depends on what events are described; its status as analytic or synthetic depends on how the 
events are described.” Hence, Davidson argues, the logical connection argument fails.  
Davidson’s own view of causation was nevertheless quite naïve. He thought that 
causation is an absolute and simple relation between events. However, there are reasons to 
think that causal judgments are more relative than that: it has become increasingly popular 
to think that causal claims involve (even if often only implicitly) a contrastive class for both 
cause and effect, that is, they contrast alternatives to the putative cause and effect. Contrasts 
may be chosen differently, depending on one’s interests and background assumptions (see, 
e.g., Hitchcock 1996). Some contrasts need to be fixed; otherwise, causal claims are not even 
unambiguous. Note that different choices of contrasts lead to different causal claims, some 
of which may be false, some true. Causal relation is thus also in a sense relative to 
descriptions. 
Does this rebut Davidson’s response? I do not think so. I contend that we must 
distinguish two different ways in which a causal judgment can be relative to descriptions. 
Even when particular contrast classes have been chosen and fixed, it may be still possible to 
pick up the cause and the effect by different descriptions. And at this second stage, 
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Davidson’s key idea becomes relevant. In sum, I think that Davidson’s argument is at least 
on the right track.  
Accordingly, even transparently causal natural relations can be described as 
“logically” connected; for example:  
 
Radiation sickness is caused by exposure to high amounts of ionizing radiation 
 
The victim’s passing away was brought about by her cause of death 
 
Overexposure to the sun causes sun-stroke 
 
But although in all these cases there is a conceptual connection between the relata, it would 
be preposterous to insist that the relation between them is not causal. 
The logical connection argument admittedly has a certain intuitive appeal; I grant that 
some explanations in terms of reasons and intentions really are somewhat empty and trivial. 
But this only means that they do not satisfy certain further criteria of a good and informative 
explanation10—they may share the shortcomings of the notorious “virtus dormativa” 
explanation.11 This does not mean that it is not a causal relation that is in question; some true 
causal statements just are not that informative.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In retrospect, we can conclude that the whole juxtaposition between explanation and 
understanding—so popular in the philosophy of the social sciences for so long—has been, 
above all, a confusion based on the outdated positivist view of causation and causal 
explanation.  
Even in many natural sciences other than physics, such as the biological sciences, there 
are very few genuine laws, if any, and typical explanations in these sciences, which 
intuitively count as causal explanations, do not involve any laws. Consequently, it is hardly 
surprising that the social sciences do not have many explanations which involve laws either. 
The reasonable conclusion is that causation does not require laws—not that there are no 
causal explanations in the social sciences. The popular alternative view today is that 
causation only requires counterfactual dependencies.12 It is very natural to see social 
scientific explanations as referring to such dependencies.  
“Understanding” can, of course, mean a number of things in different contexts, but in 
the dispute at hand, it refers most commonly to understanding the behavior and action of 
                                                          
10 Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010), for example, suggest that different dimensions of the goodness of an 
explanation include non-sensitivity, cognitive salience, precision, factual accuracy, and degree of integration. 
11 In Moliere’s play “Le Malade Imaginaire” (1673), a doctor explains opium’s disposition to make people 
sleepy by its virtus dormativa, that is, “dormative virtue”—which is, of course, utterly empty and useless as an 
explanation.  
12 It is of course reasonable to think that counterfactuals are more generally grounded on various laws and 
regularities. The point here is simply that there need not to be any law connecting events of type C (events that 
are like c) to events of type E (events like e) for c to be a cause of e. The corresponding counterfactual may be 
often grounded on regularities other than the one between c and e. 
9 
 
human agents on the basis of internal motives and the reasons that guide them. 
Understanding in this sense is not, in the light of the above-mentioned advances in the theory 
of causation, the qualitatively different opposite of causal explanation—it is a kind of causal 
explanation.  
 
University of Tampere 
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